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1. Introduction  
ose Piñera, the mind behind the monumental pension reform in Chile, is 
a true scholar. He studied the works of John Locke, Adam Smith, Karl 
Popper, and of course, the great Milton Friedman. It was in Friedman’s 
1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom, that Piñera discovered the concept of a 
privatized social security system. Piñera believed that to resurrect Chile 
from a state of poverty and oppression, sweeping economic and political 
reforms based on individual freedom must occur. In his essay, 
‚Empowering Workers: The Privatization of Social Security in 
Chile‛,ghegwrites: 
My ideas for pension reform were then part of an overall vision of a 
free market and a free society in Chile. At the ministry, I assembled an 
excellent team to help me design not only the new system but also a 
transition strategy. For decades in Chile, those striving for pension 
reform had failed, because their plans were partial and flawed. I 
decided that we should "take the bull by the horns." My motto was 
that we needed a "radical reform with a conservative execution." I 
remember often reiterating to my team that there was nothing as 
satisfying in life as to do something others deem impossible. We were 
bound together by our faith in the power of ideas and by the 
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2. Chile’s Pension Reform 
On November 4th, 1980, Chile enacted its Pension Reform program, 
which has since become the gold standard for private social security 
systems around the world. With this new program, Chileans who were 
previously under the old pay-as-you-go system, could opt out of the 
government run public pension system and put their money into a 
privately managed Personal Retirement Account (PRA). ‚Since 99% percent 
of the employed workers are now in the PRA system, the end result was a 
‘privatization from below’, that is reflecting worker's wishes, of Chile's 
pension system‛ (Piñera, 1996). 
Every month, the employer deposits 10% of a worker’s wages tax-free 
into his or her PRA; the worker then has the option to make up to an 
additional 10% tax-deductible deposit into the PRA. Private pension fund 
companies manage these PRA’s. The worker has the freedom to choose 
which company he or she wants to manage their PRA. These private 
pension fund companies (known as AFPs, or "Administradora de Fondos 
de Pensiones") exist in an industry purposefully designed to be 
competitive. Both domestic and foreign companies have the right to apply 
to the Superintendency of the AFPs (officially La Superintendencia de 
Pensiones de Chile) to enter the AFP industry. The worker also has the 
right to move his or her PRA to another AFP at any time. This competition 
benefits the account holder through the encouragement of better returns, 
better service, and lower commissions. Each AFP manages a mutual fund 
family with five funds, each with different allocations of stocks and bonds. 
Workers may choose which funds he or she wants to invest in based on his 
or her risk preference, within limits. For example, older workers must own 
more stable funds with primarily bonds, while younger workers may have 
up to 80% of their holdings in equities. AFP managers have the ability to 
invest the funds’ money in any asset of their choosing. There is no 
requirement to invest any money in Chilean bonds or equities. 
Furthermore, AFPs are subject to government oversight. ‚Legally, the AFP 
companies and mutual funds are separate entities. The AFPs are subject to 
strict and technical oversight by the Superintendency of AFP, a government 
organization‛ (Piñera, 1996). 
Upon retirement, a person has access to all the funds that have 
accumulated in their PRA. The retiree pays taxes on withdrawals according 
to their tax bracket at that time. A key difference between the new pension 
reform program and the last is more flexible access to the accrued 
retirement benefits. The former pay-as-you-go system required men to 
work until 65 and women to work until 60. Under the new system, workers 
can choose to retire at any age, giving workers the option to continue 
working longer than what may be deemed necessary. The retiree has the 
ability to access their funds when he or she is ready, whether that be before 
or after the previously mandated ‚retirement age.‛ Workers could opt to 
have more of their salary diverted tax-free by their employers in order to 
accelerate their retirement plans or to create larger nest eggs.  
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
 R. Baber, & E. Taufer, JSAS, 8(1), 2021, p.36-51. 
38 
38 
‚Safety nets‛ exist for workers whose accounts perform especially 
poorly. As long as a worker contributed to a PRA for a minimum of twenty 
years and has reached the minimum age, he or she is eligible for a 
‚minimum pension,‛ also known as a solidarity pension, funded by 
general government revenues once their PRA is depleted (Piñera, 1996). 
Note a minimum age requirement exists for a solidarity pension, but not 
for those whose pensions have performed adequately. This system has 
since been updated which is visited in future sections. 
‚In the PRA system, workers with sufficient savings in their accounts to 
buy an annuity equal to 70 percent of the average salary of the previous 10 
years, as long as it is higher than the ‘minimum pension’, can cease 
working at any time, begin withdrawing their money, and stop 
contributing to their accounts. Of course, workers can continue working 
after beginning to retire their money. A worker must reach the legal 
retirement age to be eligible for the government subsidy that guarantees 
the minimum pension. But in no way is there an obligation to cease 
working, at any age, nor is there an obligation to continue working or 
saving for retirement benefit purposes once you have assured yourself the 
benefit described above‛ (Piñera, 1996). 
Retirees have three basic payout options. Under the first payout option, 
the retiree may use the funds that have accumulated in his or her PRA to 
purchase an annuity from any private life insurance company. The 
purchased annuity must pay a monthly income for the remainder of the 
retiree’s life, indexed to inflation. It must also provide survivors’ benefits 
for the retiree’s dependents. In the second payout option, the retiree may 
leave the accumulated funds in the PRA and regularly withdraw money, 
subject to limits based on the retiree’s life expectancy and dependents. If 
the retiree passes away, the funds left in the PRA are given to heirs as a 
portion of the retiree’s estate. The third option consists of any combination 
of the first two. 
The PRA system is entirely supported by employees. Because employer 
contributions are viewed as part of one’s gross wage, all PRA contributions 
are paid by the worker, thereby giving him or her complete control of his or 
her future retirement savings. Since the PRA is not provided by an 
employer, workers have the opportunity to leave a firm and have their 
retirement savings transfer with them. This contrasts with some pensions 
systems that punish workers who leave the company before a given 
number of years. Not only is it easy for workers to transfer retirement 
funds across companies, it is also easy for PRAs to be transferred from one 
AFP to another, due to the fact that each PRA is invested in securities. The 
PRA system is intended to promote labor market mobility and flexibility. 
One of the major problems with pay-as-you-go systems is unfunded 
pension liabilities. Current workers pay taxes to support the retirement of 
the retired population. This creates a conflict when the number of retirees 
grows larger than the working population. Unchecked, this could lead to 
future bankruptcy problems, such as those currently faced by the United 
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States. The PRA system seeks to eliminate the possibility of 
intergenerational conflict caused by unfunded or underfunded pension 
liabilities. 
 
3. The transition 
One of the main challenges in fully implementing a PRA system is 
managing the transition from a traditional pay-as-you-go system. Chile 
completed the transition by adhering to three rules. 
1. The government promised to honor previous agreements made to 
older citizens. Those who had been guaranteed pension benefits or who 
were already receiving benefits would not be affected by the change.  
2. Current adults in the labor force had the option to remain in the 
pay-as-you-go system or transition to the PRA system. Those who made 
the switch to the PRA system received a ‚recognition bond‛ that was 
deposited in their new PRA. The bond earned four percent interest and was 
indexed to inflation. The recognition bond matured at retirement; however, 
it could be traded in secondary markets to allow workers to build capital. 
The issuance of these bonds ensured that workers who already contributed 
to the pay-as-you-go system did not start with zero Chilean pesos in their 
PRA. 
3. All new adults entering the labor force were automatically enrolled 
in the PRA system. This guaranteed that the pay-as-you-go system would 
slowly be phased out and would completely end when the final pay-as-
you-go system worker entered retirement. 
Through the transition, the establishment of the AFP industry was 
heavily regulated. For a six-month period, no AFP could begin operations. 
This grace period attempted to give all parties the opportunity to establish 
an AFP. Unlike many new industries, the AFP industry had a clear 
conception and birth date. 
Because fiscal costs would be incurred during the transition, five 
methods were used to finance the costs of the PRA system’s 
implementation: 
1. Issuing debt: 
By using debt, the system could share costs across generations. Debt also 
created interest bearing securities that could be added by AFPs to PRA 
portfolios. 
2. Implementing a ‚transition tax‛: 
Under the PRA system, retirement savings were actually taxed less than 
the amount paid in payroll taxes under the old system. A portion of the 
difference was used as a temporary transition tax. 
3. Selling government assets: 
The Chilean government sold off large government owned enterprises. 
The government used funds from the purchase of these companies to 
finance the PRA, while the workers benefited from more efficient, 
privatized companies. 
4. Reducing government expenditure: 
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A consistent government budget surplus, coupled with strict limits to 
increasing government expenditure, helped finance the transition. 
5. Tax revenue from economic growth: 
The economic stimulus from the new PRA system substantially 
increased tax revenue. 
 
4. A history of the AFPs 
Currently, there are seven AFPs in the system, five of which have 
existed since the inception of the system in 1981: AFP Capital, Cuprum, 
Habitat, PlanVital, and Provida. AFP Modelo was created in February of 
2007, and AFP Uno, the newest fund in the system, began operations on 
October 1st, 2019. 
At the time of the establishment of the AFPs in 1981, funds were only 
allowed to invest in ‚low-risk domestic instruments‛ including but not 
limited to government bonds and highly rated corporate bonds. In fact, 
100% of funds could be invested in government bonds. As time passed, the 
proportion of a fund that could be invested in government securities 
decreased, and higher exposure to stocks and other securities were 
gradually ushered into portfolios. In 1996, AFPs began to invest in foreign 
securities. By being able to invest in foreign securities, funds could chase 
higher returns while taking pressure and reliance off of domestic markets 
(Kritzer, 2008). 
In 1981, only one type of allocation was permitted, today known as 
Fund C. The returns for Fund C for each of the original five AFPs is 
depicted below in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average annual real return for fund C by AFP 
 
In August of 2002, a law was passed that ‚requires each AFP to offer 
four different types of funds —called Funds B, C, D, and E—with varying 
degrees of risk. AFPs may also offer a Fund A with up to 80 percent of its 
assets in equities‛ (Kritzer, 2008). The fund equity limits are outlined in the 
table (Figure 2) below. 
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Figure 2. Limits on investment in equity 
 
The Superintendency of the AFPs regulates each fund such that it has 
minimum and maximum rates of return it must meet over a 3-year period. 
The AFP originally had to maintain fluctuation funds, comprised of any 
returns over the maximum rate of return, to cover any future shortages. 
According to Law 3500, if an AFP missed its minimums and did not have 
enough saved in the fluctuation fund, the government ‚makes up the 
difference, dissolves the AFP, and transfers the accounts to another AFP‛ 
(Kritzer, 2008). The 2008 reform (covered in a later section) eliminated all 
fluctuation funds and distributed the monies among the AFPs. 
The average annual real rates of return for each fund type for the 
original five AFPs are shown in Figure 3. The return rates are shown since 
the multifund law passed in 2002. 
 
 
Figure 3. Average annual real return by AFP and fund type 
 
Figure 4 below displays the total annual returns for each fund type. This 




Figure 4. System return by fund type since inception 
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To properly analyze AFP returns, it is necessary to compare the returns 
to a benchmark.  One can compare the AFP system returns to the real 
returns of the Santiago Stock Exchange, Chile’s domestic stock market. The 
following analysis uses the IGPA Index as its benchmark. The IGPA is a 
market capitalization-weighted index that measures prices of a majority of 
the Santiago Exchange’s listed securities. According to Bloomberg, from 
August 2002, when funds A through E were established, to October 2019, 
the Chilean stock market has seen an average annual nominal return of 
9.5507%. To calculate real returns, Chilean year-over-year inflation over the 
same period (08/01/2002 - 10/30/2019) was subtracted from the nominal rate 
of return. According to the EHPICL Index, Chile’s inflation index, year-
over-year inflation for that period was 3.2%. This demonstrates that the 
Chilean stock market, from August 2002 to October 2019, has seen an 
average annual real return of 6.3507%. 
Remarkably, this real rate of return is in line with the real profitability of 
the Fund A system since its inception (Figure 4). This is of note due to the 
fact that Fund A was able to match these returns while still maintaining a 
less risky portfolio comprised of at least 20% fixed income. More fixed 
income reduces total risk. In addition to an asset-diversified portfolio, Fund 
A achieved these results while having international, not just domestic, 
market exposure. This is a unique feat for the AFP system and, one could 
say, a success to Dr. Piñera’s initial goals of giving citizens superior money 
management and independence under a PRA private pension system. 
 
5. Further AFP fund analysis 
To fully understand the AFP fund types and their returns, it is important 
to analyze each fund’s average geographic allocation. To conduct this 
analysis, the percent of each AFP’s Fund ‚X‛ investment in Chilean and 
foreign holdings was computed. Then, an overall system average was 
calculated using the individual allocations of each fund. This analysis is 
important because with the allowance of international diversification in 
1996, AFPs could change each portfolio’s domestic market exposure, 
allowing the AFPs to manipulate each fund’s risk and returns. Below is a 
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Figure 5. Averages 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
As seen in Figure 3, Fund A has consistently had the highest rate of 
return since 2002. While this fund may be less risky than a Chilean stock 
market index fund due to equity and fixed income diversification, Fund A 
is still the riskiest of the five types of AFP funds. Though Fund A has the 
highest share of equity investments, this geographic analysis concluded 
that Fund A also has the smallest allocation of Chilean holdings. As the 
funds get less risky and decrease their holdings in equities, the share of 
holdings in Chilean investments increases from 20.77% of Fund A (Figure 
5) to 75.56% of Fund E (Figure 8). 
Regardless of the fund type, the largest proportion of holdings are 
Chilean. However, there is no requirement for AFP funds to hold Chilean 
stocks and bonds. With that said, Chile is one of the strongest economies in 
Latin America with highly rated debt, so holding Chilean instruments is a 
valid investment. Other countries with notable geographic allocations are 
the United States, China, Brazil, and Mexico. 
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Within one month of inception, a quarter of the labor force signed up for 
the PRA system; today, over 99% of Chilean workers are enrolled in the 
PRA system. 
According to Piñera, ‚since the system began to operate on May 1, 1981, 
to September 2014, the average real return of the balanced Fund (Fund C) 
has been an extraordinary 8.6 percent per year (during 33 years). Of course, 
the annual yield has shown the oscillations that are intrinsic to the free 
market-ranging from minus 3 percent to plus 30 percent in real terms, but 
the important yield is the average one over the working life of a person (say 
40-45 years) or the full working plus retired life (say 55-60 years) if a person 
chooses the programmed withdrawal option‛ (1996). 
Total assets under the PRA system were 70% of total Chilean GNP in 
2014and are forecasted to equal GNP in the future. Economists have 
attributed Chilean economic growth over the last several decades to such 
long-term capital investment. The Pension Reform of 1980 has decreased 
overall poverty numbers due to an increase in old age, survivors’, and 
disability benefits. Additionally, pension and welfare changes lowered 
Chilean government expenditures by several percentage points between 
1981 and 1990. According to Piñera, ‚the Pension Reform of 1980 was the 
single most important structural change that contributed to the doubling of 
the growth rate of the economy in the 1985-1997 period (from the historic 
3% to 7.2%).‛ Private pensions allow Chilean workers to contribute to the 
growth of the economy and reap its benefits. However, this also comes 
with enduring the consequences of domestic market volatility and market 
crashes, which is why foreign diversification became inevitable. 
 
6.1. Pension reform in 2008 
In March of 2008, a major round of Chilean pension reform took place 
when Law 20.255 was passed. The reform was pushed due to low rates of 
replacement—the percent of a workers full time income that was covered 
under the pension upon retiring—in addition to estimates that ‚more than 
50% of them [individuals in the pension system] would not meet the 
requirement of 20 years of contributions for access to the state guarantee of 
the minimum pension,‛ among other things. 
‚The Pension Reform Act of 2008 contains about 100 measures, which 
can be classified into seven categories: i) solidarity pension system; ii) 
gender dimension; iii) policies for the most vulnerable youth; iv) policies 
for independent workers; v) improvement of the individual capitalization 
system; vi) public institutions, and vii) fiscal sustainability. 
The Chilean pension reform of 2008 had three main objectives. The first 
was to create a solidarity pension system (SPS) that combated poverty 
among the elderly of 65 years and older (and people with disabilities). This 
meant that the state assumed the role of guarantor of the pension system 
for the population belonging to the first three income quintiles (60%), in 
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addition to establishing a universal rights perspective around social 
protection for those who will develop their working life in Chile. The 
second objective was to increase the coverage of both assets and liabilities 
from vulnerable groups, specifically young people, women and 
independent workers. The third objective of the reform was to contribute to 
the improvement of the individual capitalization system through the 
promotion of competition, the regulation of investments, and the cost 
reduction and strengthening of voluntary pension savings‛ (Arenas de 
Mesa, 2019). 
The creation of the SPS was focused on increasing overall coverage of 
workers under the pension system. Between March of 2008 and December 
of 2018, it is reported that nearly three times the number of workers were 
covered under the SPS than had been previously covered under the old 
welfare pension system as coverage increased from 610,000 to about 1.5 
million individuals. 
 
6.2. Pension reform in 2019 
Over the last several years, starting primarily in 2017, political tensions 
have stirred up talks of another pension system reform in Chile, the largest 
since 2008. According to Allan Brown of BNAmericas, ‚regarding AFPs, for 
some time now there has been a high level of discontent among workers 
because of the small pensions they tend to provide and the size of the fees 
the AFPs charge. People are also generally aware of the healthy profits that 
AFPs make even when the returns are negative or weak. Few people really 
understand how the system works and what their rights are. Among the 
many grievances that have given rise to the current protests in Chile, the 
private pension system is one of them‛ (November 2019). 
Current president Sebasti{n Piñera submitted a bill in 2018 that would 
dramatically change the current system layout. Major proposed changes 
include ‚strengthening the social safety net for the elderly, supporting the 
middle class - particularly women - and increasing the size of pensions.‛ 
Additionally, an important component is requiring employers to contribute 
4% to their employees’ pensions. The latter proposal would create a total of 
14% mandatory contributions of wages to an employee’s PRA before any 
additional contribution is made by the employee, in an effort to increase 
overall payouts. 
Much time has been spent on debate over whether taxes or additional 
contributions should go towards funding solidarity (non-contributory) 
pensions. Regardless of the means of funding them, ‚they are deemed to be 
insufficient. The government said it will increase the size of solidarity 
pensions by 20%. In general, the government has been reactive, only acting 
when pressured by massive street protests‛ (Brown November 2019). 
As of November 2019, the major protests currently ongoing in the 
country have led to ‚a landmark victory *for protesters+... as lawmakers 
agreed to hold a referendum on the nation’s dictatorship-era constitution… 
the agreement, which calls for a plebiscite in April [2020], was signed after 
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two intense days and nights of negotiations between opposing parties in 
the National Congress‛ (Krygier, 2019). Regardless of the 2019 movement’s 
outcome, major changes are bound to take place in Chile in the near future. 
A key driver behind protester aggression is the current pension system, 
which is now expected to see serious revisions. 
 
6.3. Positive takeaways 
When compared to the original pay-as-you-go system that existed in 
Chile prior to 1980—as well as similar public pensions and social security 
funds worldwide—there are several key goals that the Chilean Pension 
Reform of 1980 sought to achieve that led to positive results. 
The current system allows contributing workers to choose the risk 
allocation of their invested funds, compared to the government having full 
control over this choice. In addition, unlike the old system in which males 
had to reach the age of 65 and women had to reach the age of 60 before 
being eligible to receive benefits, the current system has no set minimum 
retirement age. As long as a person is able to accumulate a minimum value 
in their PRA, they can retire at the earliest age possible. Alternatively, they 
can continue to work however long they desire before being forced to take 
benefits. For those who are unable to reach the minimum pension threshold 
to retire, whether that was due to low contributions over time or poor 
investment returns, they are eligible for government subsidies up to a 
minimally deemed pension value. 
While this may change in the future, the PRA system is currently fully 
employee funded, as the employer directly contributes 10% of employee 
wages to their PRA. In the Chilean labor environment, retirement benefits 
are universal from company to company and do not factor into hiring 
decisions. This policy gives workers complete control of their future 
retirement savings as they freely transfer from job to job. 
Additionally, unlike pay-as-you-go systems, the PRA system allows one 
to support their own retirement. Pay-as-you-go systems are in danger as 
the number of retirees grows faster than the working population who 
supports them and as retirees live longer into retirement. These problems 
create unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities, causing 
intergenerational conflict where young people wonder why they are 
supporting another generation’s retirement instead of their own. 
Finally, AFPs manage money extremely well. As was examined in the 
funds section, real profitability is in the 6-8% range for equity-weighted 
funds and in the 4-5% range for bond and fixed income funds over a 17 
year time period (a 38 year period for Fund C). Additionally, since 1996 
when foreign investments were included in equity portfolios to wane off 
domestic market reliance and chase higher gains, returns have remained 
steady while the funds have become more diversified. As can be seen in the 
fund analysis pie charts, the geographic breakdown of holdings has 
become more efficient, diversifying by expanding to more markets. 
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However, this has not been relayed effectively to citizens, as is covered in 
the shortfalls section. 
 
6.4. Shortfalls 
While the Chilean PRA system is an improvement over the former pay-
as-you-go system, there are still numerous shortfalls that make the system 
imperfect. 
The Superintendency, tasked to regulate AFPs, has laws in place to 
enforce minimum rates of return; however, an AFP dissolution has never 
occurred under Law 3500. It is unclear exactly how the government would 
make up the difference if a significant market correction occurred that 
caused many or all of the AFPs to miss their minimums. According to 
Brown, ‚we know that no AFP has ever been dissolved because of poor 
returns. Proposals, such as prohibiting AFPs from charging fees for months 
when returns are negative, have been put forward. It could become a 
reality; it has been part of discussions.‛ It is unknown how the 
Superintendency would fund this gap, either through the Chilean 
government or other means [tax hikes]. What is known, however, is that 
nothing is set in stone, and the Superintendency is ill prepared to act on 
such a situation. 
Flaws in the PRA system emerge when the market underperforms as 
well. Citizens are familiar with the profits AFPs make, regardless of fund 
performance. Additionally, AFP managers do not bear the same risk as 
PRA holders. AFP managers are incentivized to chase the highest possible 
returns, as higher returns would guarantee higher commissions. If the AFP 
manager makes a risky investment that does not materialize, the manager 
does not receive his or her commision, but the Chilean worker loses his or 
her retirement. A great risk tolerance mismatch exists between the two 
parties. 
The AFP system was established with the intention of simulating a free 
market environment. This environment would spur competition among 
funds to provide individuals with more competitive service, management 
fees, and returns. The system currently has only seven AFPs, with AFP 
Modelo beginning operations in February of 2007, and AFP Uno beginning 
operations in October of 2019. Brown says, ‚there’s no real general sense 
that there is corruption in that only 7 AFPs exist...the entry barriers to start 
an AFP in Chile are very high, however...for some time now there has been 
a high level of discontent among individuals because of the small pensions 
they [AFPs] tend to provide and the size of the fees the AFPs charge. ‛ It 
appears the screening process is rather exclusive, and workers could 
benefit from a larger volume of AFPs in the system. 
According to the July 2006 President's Pension Advisory Commission 
Report (Marcel Commission 2006), ‚the capitalization (privatized) system is 
geared toward workers with stable jobs who regularly contribute to an 
individual account for their entire working lives‛ (Kritzer, 2008). Thus, 
those who participate in the informal labor market, part time workers, or 
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the temporarily unemployed, etc. cannot regularly contribute to their PRA 
as they have no formal full time employment. This becomes a problem 
when calculating twenty years of full time labor service for solidarity 
pensions, as well as giving such workers access to AFP management 
services. Additionally, as of the 2006 report, just under 40% of workers 
were not covered by either the public or private pension systems. Figure 
10below shows how PRA contributors have declined as a percent of the 
formal labor force from 1982-2007 (Kritzer, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 10. Percentage of affiliates that contributed to their individual accounts, 1982-2007 
 
Several issues with the Superintendency hinder the progress of the PRA 
system as well. The way in which the Superintendency reports data makes 
it difficult for the average worker to digest. There are also few ways to 
contact the Superintendency, as there is no email on their website. This lack 
of transparency creates distrust between the people and authority as It is 
difficult to recreate or verify the figures published by the Superintendency. 
The fact that many Chileans retire with low pensions is not principally 
linked to returns. As Allan Brown said in an interview, ‚...pension fund 
members in Chile are largely unaware that, over the past 17 years, returns 
have been pretty good on average…this comes down to the issue of 
financial education.‛ Encuesta de Previsión Social, a survey conducted by the 
University of Chile, questioned 24,000 individuals and found that under 
half of those surveyed were aware of the required monthly contribution 
and only 20 percent of those surveyed knew how many fund options 
existed. Additionally, only 50 percent of those surveyed were even aware 
of how much he or she had saved for retirement (Kritzer, 2008). A lack of 
financial literacy and general knowledge of the PRA system hinders the 
system’s progress and effectiveness. 
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the PRA system and the reforms 
that have occurred over time in an effort to identify weaknesses, enhance 
strengths, and develop proposals for further reform. Accordingly, such 
analysis could potentially be used as a model for countries facing a pension 
crisis looking to change their existing systems. ‚Pension privatization 
policies, applied in the past in some countries, did not yield the expected 
results since the coverage and the benefits did not increase, the systemic 
risks fell on the people and the tax situation got worse. Consequently, 
several countries are reversing the privatization measures taken and 
restoring public systems based on solidarity‛ (Arenas de Mesa, 2019). 
Without proper reform, the future of the privatized pension system is in 
danger. It is clear that a privatized pension system is a superior option to a 
pay-as-you-go system in many instances, but the Chilean system should 
not be implemented elsewhere in its current form. 
Instead of attempting to implement a new privatized pension system 
from scratch, it is encouraged to implement Chile’s pension reform with the 
following modifications, as Chile’s reform included a solid framework and 
a well-planned transition period. 
The question of how minimum return rates will be met in the case of a 
significant market correction is still up for debate. But, it would benefit 
Chile and future systems to establish stronger insurance for such instances 
as the elimination of the AFP fluctuation funds essentially wiped out all of 
the AFP insurance policies in the case of poor returns. 
As for competition, the Superintendency standards while noble, could 
benefit from some leniency adjustments. While still barring AFPs with poor 
finances and those that could be fraudulent from entering the system, 
lower barriers to entry would allow for the creation of more AFPs and 
benefit individuals with true competitive pricing and service. Other 
countries could adopt this AFP approval strategy from inception. 
While the exact solution to the problem is not entirely clear, the fact that 
individuals with multiple part time jobs, temporary unemployment, or 
those that perform informal sector work are not accumulating contributions 
toward their PRA and years toward their labor timeline—because their 
situation is not viewed as being a part of the formal labor market—is 
problematic. While the simplicity of one vehicle for all retirement purposes 
is efficient, countries looking to make such a transition must keep people 
like these in mind and find a way to service them properly without leaving 
them uncovered. 
Despite extensively perusing the Superintendence website during 
research, it is not easy to navigate or comprehend. Especially for the 
average worker trying to learn more about the system, it would benefit 
both parties to have clearer data presentation. For countries looking to 
transition, creating an easily navigable site would most likely cause less 
confusion for workers in the system. 
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A lack of financial literacy is a serious setback for a privatized pension 
system for two main reasons. A financial illiterate population is unable to 
comprehend PRA returns, positive or negative. Secondly, the effectiveness 
of the system is arguably irrelevant if workers do not understand the 
management or progress of their finances. An educational program must 
be established to teach workers about topics such as contributions, risk, 
diversification, and the options that exist under the privatized pension 
system. 
The following pieces of the system have done well for Chile and should 
be similarly implemented in a future system. 
The ability to invest a desired amount based on personal contributions 
and risk tolerance gives workers increased autonomy and control over their 
retirement. Additionally, the PRA system gives workers increased freedom 
through the removal of the minimum retirement age and increased ease of 
job mobility. 
The need for pension reform is not unique to Chile. Countries such as 
the United States, Brazil, and the Netherlands are on the verge of a pension 
system collapse. In France, much like Chile, citizens flood the streets 
protesting for pension reform. Now, more than ever, as unfunded pension 
liabilities continue to amount, it is important to consider the possibility of a 
privatized pension system becoming the new norm. It is because of the 
work of Dr. Piñera that future countries may now have this template for a 
successful privatized pension system. 
Note: only published data and statistics were examined, as much of the 
data is unavailable for use. Some data may have been missing and, 
therefore, was not included in this paper. Using such data, if available 
elsewhere, might provide a more accurate detailing of the Chilean Pension 
System. The most important aspect of this paper was to highlight successes, 
identify weaknesses, and provide a comprehensive historical background. 
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